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Thinking About
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by Frederick Schauer
What is it to say that smoking causes cancer, that chili
causes heartburn, and that drinking causes automobile
acadents? The identification or attribution of causation
is part of our everyday conceptual apparatus. The deployment of this conceptual apparatus, however, can
be philosophidy difficult and politically controversial, as can be seen from the discussion of the report of
the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography.
The Commission's most prominent finding was exxq?pressed as a causal claim, that "substantial exposure to
sexually violent materials . . .bears a causal relation5, ship
to antisocial ads of sexual violence and, for some
j;P.: subgroups,
possibly to unlawful acts of sexual vioR' lence."' Exploration of the meaning of, justification
for, and implications of that causal claim may enlighten us about statements of causation in general, while
also helping to clarify claims made in the context of
discussing what is common1 and unfortunately referred to as "pornography. .Y
Thus, I want to inquire into what it is to make a
causal claim, what justifies making a causal claim, and
what actions might follow from a justified claim of
causation. The first of these questions is one of meaning, the second of evidence, and the third of policy,
and it will be useful to keep this distinctionin mind.
But that there is a distinction between questions of
meaning, justification, and policy does not mean that
they are unrelated. As shall be seen, for example, what
counts as sufficient evidence to justify an identification
of causation varies with the policy implications of such
an identification. Nevertheless, the questions remain
=#-

different for all their dependency on each other, and
I want to structure this analysis mund these three
issues. My purpose is not to provide a precis of the complete Repopt of the Attony, Gmnml's,Comissidn on Pornography, or even of Part Two (Part One of the private
ly published edition), which contains the analysi
findings,and conclusions of the dinC~mmission.
A w 'It
brief comments, however, may help put what I am
about to say in canted. First of allr the Report strmgl~
discourages use of the term "pornography," in part
because the pejorative conn6tations of the word
obscure any descriptive content it may possess, and
in part because the term, even if nonpejoratively restricted to material that is "predominantly sexually explicit and intended primarily for the purpose of sexual
arousal,'" is simply too broad. W of the work of the
Commission must thus be viewed through the lens of
the Commission's subdivision of both the-largeworld
of the sexually expliat and the much smaller world
of the legally obscene into three categories. These
categories are the sexually violent; the subordimathg
or degrading but not explicitly violent; and material,
no matter how explicit and no matter how unconventional the sexual practices depicted, that is
neither violent nor degrading. The Commission made
no findings spanning all three categories. With respect to the last category, which is comparatively small
within the universe of the legally obscene and'comparatively large within the universe df the sexually
explicit, the Commission concluded that there is no
causal relationship between such materials and acts
of sexual violence. Even where such material is legally '
obscene, therefore, the Commission did nat urge inaeased prosecution. It did, however, acknowledge
that a communiys decision to prosecute existing
obscenity laws with respect to material that is neither
violent.nor degrading is consistent with existing constitutional law.
What I wish to focus on, however, is the condusion
that there was a causal relitim5hip with resped to
sexuany violent materials. This conclusion was made,
but with substantiallyless confidence, with respect to
degrading materials as well. Although these findin~s
en,compassed a range of materials far broader than the
'legally obscene, the Commission rejected pleas using
that the scope of what is constitutionally regulable be

-

expanded beyond existing Supreme Court definitions.
In many areas, including this one, the First Amendment properly protects a wide range of harmful utterances, such as potential marches by Nazis in localities
inhabited by Holocaust survivors, or speeches by
the Ku Klux Klan in areas beset by racial tension, or
erroneous published condemnations of newly opened
restaurants. Thus, any plausible theory of the First
Amendment, and current First Amendment doctrine,
drives an analytic wedge between what is harmful and
what may be regulated. To say that something is harmful is not to say that it can or should be regulated. This
seems the appropriate starting place for our closer
look at the issue of causation as it relates to the Commission's primary finding regarding sexually violent
material.

What do we mean when we sav that s o m e t h n ~
causes something else? Some people speak as if an
assertion of causation were deterministic, in the sense
that the assertion that X causes Y (or that A,B, and C
together cause Y) means that X, or A,B, and C together, are universally sufficient conditions for the
production of Y. To say that there is causation under a
deterministic view of causation is to say that the cause
is invariably followed by the effect.
Deterministic views of causation do occupy some
corner of philosophical thinking about the question of
causation. Nevertheless, the perspective of causation
more commonly employed in ordinary language, and
almost universallv emvloved in the social sciences. is
probgbilisfic c a u s a f i ~ nUnder
.~
such a perspective, c i s a
causal factor for E within a population P if there would
be more E in a population in which everyone had C
than in a popuiati~nin which no one had C, assuming
that the two populations are identical in every respect
except for the presence or absence of C. This way of
putting things focuses on the incidence of the effect
within a large population, but the exact same idea can
be expressed in terms of probability for a given individual (or event) rather than incidence over a population. Thus, we can say C causes E when the presence of C makes it more probable that E will occur than
would have been the case in the absence of C.
All of this can be seen in a relatively common example, the assertion that there is a causal relationship
between cigarette smoking and contraction of lung
cancer by the smoker. To say, under a probabilistic
causation approach, that cigarette smolung causes
cancer is not to say that everyone who smokes will get
cancer. It is to say that for two otherwise identical populations of statistically
size, there will be
- significant
more cases of lung cancer in a population in which
everyone smokes than in a population in which no
one smokes. If we shift this incidence model to an individual probability model, we would say that the
claim that cigarette smoking causes cancer means
V

i

l

i

that for a given individual, the likelihood that that individual will contract lung cancer if he or she smokes is
greater for that individual than it would be, everything
else being the same, if that indvidual did not smoke.
Note, therefore, that a claim of increased incidence
or increased probabhty need not entail any particular
quantity of increase, or any particular proportion
of the effect among the relevant population. If in
a statistically significant and otherwise randomly
selected population of non-smokers there will be 16
cases of lung cancer for every thousand individuals,
and if in a statistically sigruficant and otherwise randomly selected population of smokers there wdl be 82
cases of lung cancer for every thousand individuals, a
probabilistic view of causation would identify smoking
as bearing a causal relationship to the contraction of
lung cancer. This would be the case despite the fact
that, at least on this evidence, it appears that only 82
of 1000smokers contract lung cancer. S l d a r l y , if I get
heartburn one out of 20 times after eating my usual
dnner, and one of three times after eating Mexican
food, we would normally say that Mexican food gives
me heartburn, even though I have no such symptoms
two thirds of the time that 1eat Mexican food.
Perhaps even more significantly, therefore, the
identification of one agent as a cause is not inconsistent with identifying other agents as causes
as well, or even with saying that other agents bear a
greater causal relationship to an effect than the agent
under scrutiny. To say that failure to wear seat belts
bears a causal relationship to the incidence of highway
fatalities is not inconsistent with saying that drinking,
poor driving, or other factors also bear a causal
relationshp to highway fatalities, and may be causally
related to an even greater degree.
Thus, as a matter of conceptual clarification, prior
to confronting the evidentiary issue, we can and very
often do say that causation exists to the extent that a
given agent or fact increases the probability of an effectfor an individual and the incidence for a population
over what it would be without that agent. To make the
claim, therefore, that extensive exposure to material
portraying sexual violence in a favorable light bears a
causal relationship to acts of sexual violence is not to
say that everyone so exposed will commit an act of
sexual violence. Nor is it even to say that a majority or
some other sigruficant proportion of those so exposed
will commit acts of sexual violence. It is to,say that
there will be more acts of sexual violence committed
by a population in which every member is so exposed
than by a population in w h c h no member is exposed.
Or, to put it somewhat more realistically, it is to say
that we can expect more acts of sexual violence in a
population in which such exposure is prevalent than in
a population in which there is no such exposure. This,
then, is what the claim of a causal relationship means,
and this is how it is explained in the Report. The question, then, is what would justify someone in malung
such a claim.

Questions about evidence have both a qualitative
and a quantitative dimension. What type of evidence
can justify a given conclusion or action, and how much
evidence is necessary to justify that conclusion or action? And both of these questions presuppose an answer to what might be called the contextual question.
What does an identification of causation entail in a certain context? Does it mean, following Hart and Honore,' that the agent causing the effect is in some way
out of the norm, such that it seems odd to say that
driving is a significant cause of highway fatalities, despite the fact that such an attribution of causation is
undoubtedly true given our prior definition? Or does
it mean, following C a l a b r e ~ ithat
, ~ what we identify
as a cause is realistically within our power to change,
so that, to use the same example, we may identify
drirdung as a cause of highway fatalities rather than
driving faster than 40 miles per hour because it is unrealistic to suppose that we would ever reduce the
speed limit to 40.
Once we see the contextual problem, it is clear that
the question of evidence is closely tied to the question
of what we are going to do with a "positive" finding of
causation. It is an everyday phenomenon that the
quantity and quality of the evidence.we require varies
with the consequences of the actions we are considering taking. Just as we require less evidence to impose
civil liability for conversion than we do to impose criminal penalties for theft, so too is it rational to require
less evidence for making certain personal decisions,
such as whom to exclude from the guest list for my
party or whom to vote for, than is necessary for a court
imposing civil liability.
I will return to these issues in the next section, but
they should be kept in mind in what I want to discuss
now, the questions of the quantity and quality of evidence necessary to support a determination of causation. But for the moment let us suppose that the issue
is merely the ability to assert7 that the causal relations h p exists, rather than the justification for taking restrictive actions against the cause based on the existence
of the causal relationshp.
Two questions naturally provide the focus of the inquiry. First, to what extent do we, can we, or should
we make empirical statements or empirical assessments of causality based on evidence that is not,
strictly speaking, scientific? If people can rely on their
own experiences, or their perceptions of the world, in
order to assert that Mexican food causes heartburn, or
that driving on ice causes skidding, or that excess permissiveness causes children to grow up spoiled, to
what extent can that kind of evidence, or that kind of
reasoning, be used in other arenas as well?
Second, what counts as scientrfic evidence, to the extent that we think it important to have some scientific
evidence? Is a laboratory experiment showing that
s m o b g causes lung cancer in rabbits, monkeys, and

dogs to count as scientific evidence for the proposition
that smoking causes lung cancer in human beings? If
there is scientific evidence supporting the proposition
that reports of high inflation cause young Canadian
women to buy more automobiles than they otherwise
would, is this to count as evidence for the proposition
that reports of a lessening of inflation will cause
middle-aged American men to buy fewer automobiles
than they otherwise would?
To take u p the first question, the use of nonscientific empirical evidence, we should start with the
observation that reliance on non-scientific evidence is
a staple of both public and private life. Not only do we
continually make causal assessments in our daily lives,
but these causal assessments pervadepolicymaking as
well. In New York Tinzes Co. v . Sullivaiz the Supreme
Court based its result in large part on the determination, unsupported by any scientific studies, that a legal
standard of strict liability would cause political speakers
and writers to be excessively cautious in attacking
public officials and their policies. Similarly, many
legslatures have enacted journalists' shield laws based
on the assumption that the possibility of compelled
disclosure of their identities will cause many people to
refrain from providing information to reporters. The
disclosure provisions of the securities laws are based in
part on the premise that there is a causal relationship
between disclosure of information and investor behavior, despite the fact that most investors do not base
investment decisions on information contained in
the prospectus. And many of the exemptions and deductions in the Internal Revenue Code are based on
frequently untested assumptions about economic
behavior.
I do not mean to suggest that there is anything
wrong with reliance on scientific evidence. Nor do
I deny that many of the non-scientific causal assessments of the past have proved to be erroneous, such as
the assessment that touching a toad causes warts. In
order to avoid such mistakes, perhaps it would be better if the causal assumptions of Supreme Court cases
or legislation were tested scientifically before being
allowed to undergird the law. But it remains the case
that we are far from that ideal, that life often must go
on while experiments are being conducted in the laborato,y, and that scientific experimentation is itself
often inconclusive and contradictory. Scientific experimentation is usually more accurate than the views
of the average person on the street. My point is only
that we live in a world in which basing governmental
policy decisions on empirical assessments that may
not be wholly or even largely based on scientific experimentation is an entrenched feature of political
life.
When policy decisions are based on such nonscientific evidence, the empirical presuppositions
must be tested against human experience rather than
in the laboratory. And whether such an empirical presupposition will be accepted or rejected by itself will

often turn on whether a specific empirical assumption
is consistent with the other and larger empirical assessments of our daily lives. The assumption, therefore,
that favorable portrayals of sexual violence bear a
causal relationship to acts of sexual violence is presumptively acceptable precisely because a large part of
our experiences confirm and few of our experiences
deny the hypothesis that widespread exposure to the
view that certain activity is desirable bears a positive
causal relationship to the incidence of that behavior.
Parents raise their children on this general assumption, advertisers advertise products on this general
assumption, and many people question the glorification of violence based on this general assumption.
Thus, the assertion that, speaking probabilistically,
depictions of sexual violence bear a positive causal
relationship to acts of sexual violence is little more than
the instantiation of a general causal assumption by
which most of us lead our lives.
The same does not hold true, of course, with respect
to the alleged relationship between sex alone and violence. Once we are talking not about the relation between favorable portrayals of X and the incidence of X,
our ability to tap into a wealth of human experience
evaporates. The relationship between favorable portrayals of X and Y is much more problematic, and without some more scientific evidence that things are not
what they seem, the alleged connection should be rejected. Scientific evidence of that kind does not exist,
and we are left with the conclusion that favorable portrayals of sex are likely to bear a causal relationship to
the incidence of sex, and not of violence. Those of us
for whom the incidence of sex is not seen to be a central concern of the state can thus note the existence of a
causal relationship, while at the same time saying that
the effect is not or should not be a concern.
Once we turn to scientific evidence either to support
or to rebut what would otherwise be our non-scientific
assessment of causation, we can see that there are
large varieties of scientific evidence. In most areas of
causal inquiry, a centrally debated point is the extent
to which correlational evidence is probative on the
question of causation. To say that cigarette smolung
correlates highly with lung cancer, for example, is not
necessarily to say that smoking causes cancer. After
all, as the cigarette companies have been trying to
prove for years, some third factor, genetic, behavioral,
or whatever, might cause both the inclination to smoke
and the susceptibility to lung cancer.
We are properly skeptical when the cigarette companies assert that correlation does not prove causation.
This is the case not because they are not right in the abstract, but because the extent that correlation provides
non-conclusive evidence of causation is a function of
the plausibility of some hypothesized independent
variable. We doubt the cigarette companies because
neither common sense nor scientific experimentation
leads us to believe that such a third factor exists.
By and large, this is not the case with respect to
much of the correlational evidence. whether scientific

or non-scientific, linking portrayals of either sex alone
or even sexual violence with acts of sexual violence. It
is quite possible that various forms of sexual deviancy
may lead people both to be more inclined to desire images of sexual violence and to be more inclined to commit acts of sexual violence. The correlation between
readership of Sports Illustrated and tennis elbow does
not mean that reading Sports Illustrated causes people
to get tennis elbow, but only that some third factor interest in sports - is likely to bear a causal relationship to both.
For those of us who reject virtually all of the existing
correlational evidence dealing with even sexually violent material, there is still evidence that must be examined. The properly performed control group experiment avoids the pitfalls inherent in correlational evidence by talung the test group and dividing it into two
randomly separated subgroups, and then subjecting
one subgroup to the stimulus and treating the other as
a control. To the extent that one group then shows an
effectnot present in the other, the very randomization
of all other factors serves to isolate the stimulus as the
causal factor in producing the effect.
Most control group experiments, however, must
substitute one type of potential difficulty for another.
As all readers of Arrowsmith know, performing a controlled experiment on real people involves either subjecting real people to a potentially dangerous stimulus
in the name of scienthc accuracy, or depriving people
of a potential cure in the name of that same scientlhc
accuracy. In most cases we are unwilling to do this,
and thus do not force experimental subjects to, for example, ingest substances we think might be cancerproducing. Instead, we use laboratory animals, relying
on the non-scientific, or "transscientific," as it is
called, assumption that effects measured in laboratory
animals are likely also to be present in humans.
The same necessary reliance on the transscienbfic
occurs in control group experiments on sexually violent material. Because we are properly unwilling to
wait to measure actual acts of sexual violence, scientists measure either changes in attitudes or changes in
levels of aggression, leaving it to transscientific
assumption to determine whether changes in attitudes
or increases in aggression level themselves bear a
causal relationship, in probabilistic terms, to acts of
sexual violence. Let us suppose that it could be shown,
as it in fact has been repeatedly shown in control
group experiments, that exposure to sexually violent
materials bears a causal relationship to increases in
aggressive tendencies towards women,9 or bears a
causal relationship to the attitude that women frequently desire to be raped.10 The transscientific question would remain whether more acts of sexual violence are likely to take place in a population in which
there is mole aggression towards women than in one
in which there is less aggression towards women, or
whether more acts of sexual violence are likely to take
place among a population of men who believe that
many women desire to be raped than in a population

of men who believe that women do not desire to be
raped.'' The answers to these questions, the ultimate
questions of causation, must inevitably rely on
assumptions not completely provable in a laboratory.
Perhaps the most interesting scientific question, and
one again related to what use can be made of a particular study, is what might be called the question of
localization. For example, there are many studies that
show that widespread proliferation of favorable images of beer drinking, cigarette smoking, and Ford
driving bear a causal relationship among a population
to the incidence of beer drmking, cigarette smoking,
and Ford buying. To what extent can we generalize
from these and other studies about the relationship between favorable images generally and the incidence of
the behavior generally? If we can so generalize, then it
may be the case that much of the evidence about one
specific phenomenon is evidence, albeit far from conclusive, for another phenomenon. That is what I mean
by localization, the utdity of some studies outside of
their most obvious and immediate application. Are
studies about nonsexual violence in Topeka relevant to
thmking about nonsexual violence in Burlington, and
are studies about nonsexual violence applicable to
sexual violence?
Whenever we make one of these jumps, we make an
assumption, but this kind of assumption, based on our
own experiences, or based on other studies, is part of
what we do all the time. If there are studies that show
that there is a causal relationship between portrayals of
nonsexual violence and the incidence of nonsexual violence, can we draw on these studies as part of a total
evidentiary picture in trylng to determine if there is a
causal relationshp between portrayals of sexual violence and acts of sexual violence? Perhaps there is not,
but it appears that such a discontinuity is inconsistent
with much of our experience.
The question of localization, therefore, is but a way
of focusing on the fact that most scientific studies quite
properly assert no more than can be determined by the
use of the scientific method. As a result, most scientific
studies are narrower than the potential uses to which
they may be put. Moreover, the step from the conclusion that can be stated scientificallyby scientists to another conclusion that may be justified by the first conclusion is a step that is not itself completely scientific.
When we take these steps, we should be self-conscious
about what we are doing, and especially careful of misstepping. Never to take one of those steps, however, is
to relegate most scienthc research to uselessness.

It should be apparent that the evidence necessary to
justdy saying that something bears a causal relationship to something else need not be as great as the evidence necessary to justify legal restrictions. And it is of

course familiar ground in constitutional law that the
evidence necessary to justify restricting conduct
covered by a constitutional right must be substantially
greater than the evidence necessary to justify restricting conduct not covered by a constitutional right.
Other factors also play a role in determining the extent
to which the existence of a causal relationship between
X and Y will justify restricting X. Obviously, one of
those is the question whether Y is harmful at all, and,
if so, how harmful. Social scientists quite properly do
not purport to determine moral questions, and thus
are likely to describe the causal relationship between
sexually violent materials and increased aggression
towards women as a "negative effect." Indeed, even
rape is referred to as a "negative effect," although
there is plainly some evaluation going on when the
word "negative" is used. Nevertheless, the fact that
determining whether rape or sexual harassment are
harmful is not the province of the social scientist does
not mean that it is not the province of the citizen or the
policymaker.
Although the rape example is easy, there are people
in this society who view what they think of as "deviant" sex as also harmful. Thus, if it can be shown
that there is a causal relationship between favorable
images of sexual relations between or among unmarried people and the incidence of sexual relations
between or among unmarried people, this shifts the
focus away fro111the question of whether the effect is
itself harmful. For those of us who think that this effect
is neither harmful nor the legitimate concern of the
state, the existence of a causal relationship does not
matter.
Thus, we can consider a proper governmental concern about the effect to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for government regulation. The extent to which government regulation will in fact be justified depends not only on the factors already mentioned in this section, but also on the nature of the
regulation proposed (we ought to need better evidence
to justify criminal penalties than to justify other forms
of control, for example), and, as important as it is unappreciated, on the state of the law, and the state of
perception about the law, at the time some action is
considered.
It is this last factor that turned out to be important
with respect to the Report of the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography. Law has a symbolic effect, even
more so with the public visibility of the area of law involved. consequently, it is often the case that the
specific deregulation of that which has previously
been regulated may be perceived as government imprimatur of the deregulated conduct in a way that failure to regulate that which has not previous1 been regulated will not be perceived as imprimaturJ Thus,
even if we stick to the rather settled law that the kind
of material that would be considered legally obscene is
~ initiation sf
not covered by the First ~ m e n d r n e n t , 'the
criminal penalties for constitutionally unprotected
sexually violent material would require a particularly

strong showing of causality between the putatively
restricted conduct and some harmful effect. But with
respect to the world in which we live, such material is
now subject to regulation and is in fact regulated,
admittedly with widely divergent degrees of governmental enthusiasm, by the United States and virtually all of the states. To take the affirmative step of deregulation would thus more likely be perceived as a
governmental statement that the deregulated conduct
is harmless. Because that is one likely effect of such an
action, it ought to require less evidence to justify the
continuation of regulation than it takes to justify the
initiation of regulation against the previously unregulated. Or, to put it another way, the burden of
proof ought to be on those who would have society engage in a potentially symbolic deregulation in a way
that it is on those who would have society initiate a
potentially symbolic regulation.
In the case of material that is both legally obscene
and sexually violent, deregulation would send out the
message that such material, admittedly a very thin
slice of the sexually violent images at large in the
world, is in fact harmless. Since the evidence inclines
quite strongly in the exact opposite direction, it would
be a mistake for government to send out such a message. As a result, the continuation of regulation for
material that is legally obscene and sexually violent has
its effect not primarily on the regulated material, but
upon the way people will perceive the much larger
world of properly constitutionally protected images in
which sexual violence or degradation of women is
glorified. When we see law as symbol rather than exclusively as controller, we can understand why, on the
existing state of the evidence, affirmative deregulation
of sexually violent legally obscene material would take
us away from rather than towards a world in which
coercive sexuality in all of its forms is universally
condemned.
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